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Abstract
Different measures of democracy rely on different types of data. Some exclusively rely on observational data, others rely
on judgement-based data in the form of in-house coded indicators or expert surveys. A third set of democracy measures
combines information from indicators based on different types of data, some of them also data from representative sur-
veys of the mass public. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these different types of data for the
measurement of electoral and liberal democracy. The discussion is based on the premise that the main priorities must be
to establish a high degree of concept-measure consistency, i.e. indicators capture relevant aspects of the core concept of
interest in a precise and unbiased manner, and to provide high coverage. The basic argument of the article is that no type
of data is superior to others in all respects. The article draws on examples from extant datasets to illustrate the tradeoffs
and it offers suggestions about how to reduce some of the potential drawbacks.
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Not everything that can be counted counts,
and not everything that counts can be counted.
(Cameron, 1963, p. 13)
1. Introduction
The construction and use of measures of democracy in
social scientific research has increased considerably in
recent decades. This makes good sense; without them,
the identification of trends in political rights and liber-
ties must be based on rough impressions not allowing
for systematic temporal and cross-country comparisons
(Bollen, 1992, p. 189). However, such efforts are only
valuable if the quality of the data is high in terms of reli-
ability and validity.1
When we attempt to measure democracy, the identi-
fication of empirical indicators that tap into the different
aspects of the overarching concept is one of themost im-
portant tasks. One can either use extant indicators, col-
lect new data, or combine new indicators with old ones.
The main priority must be to establish a high degree of
concept-measure consistency, i.e. the extent to which
the indicators capture all of the components of the core
concept of interest (and only those), and the extent to
which they do so in a precise and unbiased manner (Ad-
cock & Collier, 2001; Goertz, 2006; Munck, 2009).2 In the
1 Reliability concerns whether a measurement procedure produces similar results under consistent conditions. Validity concerns the extent to which a
measure plausibly captures the concept it is supposed to measure. Reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for measurement validity. See
Seawright and Collier (2014) for an overview and critical assessment of different validation strategies applied to measures of democracy. The strategies
they discuss mainly apply to extant measures, while they neither discuss the data generating procedures nor address the question of different data
types in the same level of detail as the present article.
2 Note that concept-measure consistency, besides the use of adequate indicators, also concerns the aggregation procedures used to combine the in-
formation provided by different indicators. However, the question of whether the aggregation of information provided by the indicators is based on
theoretically justified, empirically sound procedures is not part of this article’s agenda as it constitutes a rather independent issue (see Bollen & Lennox,
1991; Goertz, 2006; Møller & Skaaning, 2011, Appendix; Munck, 2009).
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words of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR, 2012, p. 50):
An important statistical consideration in identifying
and developing human rights indicators, or any set
of indicators for that matter, is to ensure their rele-
vance and effectiveness in measuring what they are
supposed to measure. This relates to the notion of in-
dicator validity. It refers to the truthfulness of infor-
mation provided by the estimate or the value of an
indicator in capturing the state or condition of an ob-
ject, event, activity or an outcome for which it is an
indicator. Most other statistical and methodological
considerations follow from this requirement.
Among the supplementary—and related—criteria that
scholars take into consideration are: Whether indicators
are produced through transparent and replicable data-
generating processes, whether they are made publicly
available, and whether they have extensive coverage in
terms of units (typically countries) and time (typically
years). Researchers face numerous tradeoffs when trying
to fulfill these criteria.
One of the most important considerations is what
type of data the ever-growing industry of measuring
democracy, governance, and human rights should rely
on (see Arndt &Oman, 2006; Landman& Carvalho, 2009,
Chapter 3; OHCHR, 2012; Schedler, 2012; United Nations
Development Programme, 2012).
Different measures of democracy are based on dif-
ferent types of data. Four main data types have been
used to construct the major democracy measures: ob-
servational data (OD), i.e. data on directly observable
facts, such as turnout rates or the presence or absence
of formal political institutions; ‘in-house’ coding (IC) by
researchers and/or their assistants based on an assess-
ment of country-specific information found in reports,
academic works, newspapers, archival material, etc.; ex-
pert surveys (ES), where selected country experts pro-
vide an evaluation based on their case-specific knowl-
edge; and representative surveys (RS), where a sample
of ordinary citizens provide judgements about particu-
lar issues.3
All of these types of sources have different strengths
and shortcomings. Even though this is well-known, con-
trasting views about what kind of data is better still ex-
ist. To illustrate, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2012), which
represents the global commitment to universal ideals of
human dignity, takes a clear stand in favor of observable
data in its widely cited report on human rights measure-
ment. This preference for fact-based quantitative indica-
tors over judgement-based indicators4 is motivated by
an interest in making assessments less subjective and
thus more broadly acceptable. According to Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010, p. 77), the data required
by judgement-based democracy measures ‘are hard, if
not impossible, to obtain. Consequently, we suspect that
these measures entail coding created on the basis of
inferences, extensions, and perhaps even guesses’ (see
also Merkel et al., 2016; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, &
Limongi, 2000; Vanhanen, 2000).
In contrast, the people behind the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators state that fact-based indicators are in-
sufficient for capturing the realities of governance out-
comes on the ground (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008). They
therefore consider judgement-based data as a valuable
tool. This position is motivated by the assumption that
it is virtually impossible to capture the relevant aspects
of governance, including democracy, without relying on
the judgement of experts, in-house coders, and/or cit-
izens (see also Bowman, Lehoucq, & Mahoney, 2005;
Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2017a,
2017b; Munck, 2009; Schedler, 2012).
To increase the awareness among producers and
users of democracy data, it seems pertinent to critically
review and supplement the arguments and suggestions
in a single article. More particularly, this article discusses
the pros and cons of different data types and suggests
how to counter some of the potential problems related
to the measurement of electoral democracy (i.e. access
to government power is determined by competitive and
inclusive elections) and liberal democracy (i.e. electoral
democracy combined with respect for civil liberties and
the rule of law) (seeMøller& Skaaning, 2011). The discus-
sion draws on extant as well as suggested indicators to
illustrate the tradeoffs. After presenting an overview of
what kind of data extant democracy measures are based
on, I discuss—for each of the four types of data in turn—
the potential advantages and disadvantages regarding re-
liability and validity together with suggestions to reduce
some of the problems. The basic argument of the arti-
cle is that no type of data is superior to the others in all
respects. Researchers should generally pay more atten-
tion to different ways of increasing valid measurement,
including the combination of different types of data and
data from different sources, whenever they construct
theirmeasures. It is not reasonable simply to stick to con-
formist practices and dogmatic doctrines about the gen-
eral superiority of one type of data.
2. Extant Democracy Measures: What Kinds of Data
Are Used?
Table 1 makes clear that there is considerable varia-
tion regarding how many kinds and which kind of data
3 In this article, I exclusively focus on different types of standards-based data and thus disregard different types of events-based data.
4 The distinction between fact-based and judgement-based indicators ‘refers to information content of the indicators in question. Accordingly, objects,
facts or events that can, in principle, be directly observed or verified, such as formal political institutions, are categorized as objective [fact-based] indi-
cators. Indicators based on perceptions, opinions, assessment or judgements expressed by individuals are categorized as subjective [judgement-based]
indicators’ (OHCHR, 2012, p. 17). However, regarding the measurement of democracy and other governance-related concepts, it is often difficult to
make a clear-cut distinction.
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sources they build on. This plethora of approaches indi-
cates that it not obvious what kind of data—or mix of
data—one should prefer when trying tomeasure democ-
racy. For some indicators, it is not easy to say if they are
fact-basedor judgement-based (more on this below). But
if we take the statements of the different data providers
as given, the Democracy–Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub
et al., 2010) and Vanhanen’s (2000) polyarchy measure
only use observational data. The first of these measures
uses indicators of legislative and executive elections, sta-
tus of the legislature, opposition parties, and govern-
ment turnovers to create a dichotomous distinction be-
tween democracies and autocracies. The second only
uses share of votes cast for the largest party and elec-
toral turnout rates in national elections to capture the
level of democracy.
The underlying data of the Bertelsmann Transforma-
tion Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017), the Freedom
in the World survey (Freedom House, 2017), and the
Perception of Electoral Integrity index (Norris, Frank,
& Martínez i Coma, 2014) are all based on expert as-
sessments. The Polity Measure (Marshall, Gurr, & Jag-
gers, 2016) and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cin-
granelli & Richards, 2010) solely rely on in-house coded
data. The remaining measures included in the overview
presented in Table 1 build on more than one kind of
data source. The Democracy Barometer dataset (Merkel
et al., 2016), the Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein,
Meserve, & Melton, 2010), and the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (Kaufman & Kray, 2017) do not pro-
vide original data collection but use extant indicators
based on all four kinds of data sources. The Varieties
of Democracy (Coppedge et al., 2017b) dataset relies
on all types of data apart from representative surveys,
and the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence
Unit (2007) only excludes in-house coded data. Finally,
the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Ger-
ring, & Bartusevičius, 2015) combines two kinds of data
sources: in-house coded data and observational data. It
varies quite a bit from measure to measure whether the
Table 1. Selected characteristics of 13 large-scale democracy datasets. Source: Coppedge et al. (2017a, p. 6) and own
assessment.
Names of Data Provider and Dataset Years Types of sources Based on various Uncertainty
covered IC OD ES RS datasets estimates
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017): 2003–2015 X No NoBertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (biennial)
Cheibub et al. (2010): 1946–2008 X No NoDemocracy–Dictatorship (DD)
Cingranelli & Richards (2010): 1981–2011 X No NoCIRI Human Rights Database (CIRI)
Coppedge et al. (2017b): 1900–2016 X X X No YesVarieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem)
Economist Intelligence Unit: 2006, 2008, X X X Yes NoDemocracy Index (EIU) 2010–2016
Freedom House: 1972–2016 X No NoFreedom in the World (FH)
Kaufmann & Kray (2017): 1996, 1998, X X X X Yes YesWorldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2000–2015
Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers (2016): 1800–2015 X No NoPolity IV (Polity)
Merkel et al. (2016): 1990–2014 X X X X Yes NoDemocracy Barometer (DB)
Norris et al. (2014): 2012–2016 X No YesPerceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI)
Pemstein et al. (2010): 1946–2012 X X X X Yes YesUnified Democracy Scores (UDS)
Skaaning et al. (2015): Lexical Index 1800–2016 X X No Noof Electoral Democracy (LIED)
Vanhanen (2000): 1810–2014 X No YesPolyarchy Dataset (Vanhanen)
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different types of data are used to measure the same
subcomponents and components of the overall democ-
racy measures.
Disagreements about best practices regarding what
kind of data to employ continue to flourish. The great
variation not only reflects differences in resources; it also
indicates different weighting of the potential problems
related to data types. Butwhat are themore specific pros
and cons of different data types? How can the data type
choice matter for reliability and validity?
3. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of
Different Kinds of Data
3.1. Observational Data
Observational data have a high, often preferred stand-
ing among users of social science data. In the words of
Cheibub et al. (2010, p. 74), ‘The reliability of a measure
depends on whether knowledge of the rules and the rel-
evant facts is sufficient to unambiguously lead different
people to produce identical readings on specific cases’.
On this basis, they prefer democracy measures based
on directly observable and verifiable indicators rather
than subjective and fuzzy indicators. Among the main as-
sets of a fact-based approach to measurement are trans-
parency and a replicable data-generation process, which
is generally less susceptible to biases than judgement-
based data types (see below). Moreover, observational
data often provides scales of the phenomena in question
that are both relatively easy to interpret and comparable
across countries and over time (OHCHR, 2012).
However, the assumptions underlying this prefer-
ence are criticized for being unrealistic. According to
Schedler (2012, p. 28), the collection and use of non-
judgmental data in the social sciences rests on two con-
ditions: ‘(1) transparent empirical phenomenawhose ob-
servation do not depend on our judgmental faculties and
(2) complete public records on those phenomena’.When
we want to measure democracy, none of these criteria
are met. Not all aspects of democracy are easily observ-
able and, relatedly, official statistics do not capturemany
relevant features inmeaningful ways. Readily observable
empirical information is often incomplete, inconsistent,
or insufficient. ‘Some empirical phenomena we cannot
observe in principle, others we cannot observe in prac-
tice’ (Schedler, 2012, p. 28).
A particular problem emerges when measuring
democracy by examining the official (formal) laws of the
land, first and foremost the constitution:5 There is often
a large discrepancy between what appears on the books
and what is practiced on the ground. Informal rules and
traditions are often more important than formal regula-
tions. To illustrate this point with an extreme example,
the Soviet 1936 constitution (aka. the Stalin Constitution)
promised free and fair elections and respect for civil lib-
erties on top social and economic rights. In practice, how-
ever, the political regimewas totalitarian (see Linz, 2000),
including a level of state repression that has hardly been
matched by any other political regime in world history.
This problem refers to more than discrepancies be-
tween de jure and de facto regulations. For example,
OHCHR (2012, p. 97) has suggested using reported cases
of killing, disappearances, detention, and torture against
journalists to measure freedom of opinion. This could be
a relevant indicator but has two significant shortcomings.
On the one hand, there is likely to be a reporting bias
because reliable information is often not readily avail-
able (see Fariss, 2014; McNitt, 1988, pp. 94–99; Weid-
mann, 2016). The perpetrators normally have a clear in-
terest in keeping the correct number secret and it is of-
ten difficult to know why a particular journalist has dis-
appeared or died, or whether they were imprisoned due
to a legitimate use of their freedom of expression or
someother reasons. On the other hand, anticipated sanc-
tions often lead to self-censorship. Journalists are rarely
killed in North Korea (as far as we know), because they
know that criticizing the government would have dire
consequences. These problemswould apply to similar at-
tempts at capturing respect for liberal rights and adher-
ence to the rule of law by the (exclusive) use of observa-
tional indicators.
Among the attempts to measure democracy using
observational data, we find the democracy–dictatorship
dataset (Cheibub et al., 2010; Przeworski et al., 2000). Its
reliance on the rule of electoral government turnover to
determinewhether elections have been free suffers from
two problems. First, the so-called Botswana problem,
i.e. a government seems to be continuously reelected
through free elections, meaning that Botswana (and
other such cases) does not fulfill the turnover-criterion,
saying that an alternation in government power has
taken place under electoral rules identical to those bring-
ing the incumbent into power. Second, the turnover cri-
terion is implemented in a way that could introduce fur-
ther problems. The coding rule says that a government
turnover implies that a particular regime is coded as
democratic all the way back to when the previous gov-
ernment took power given that the case also fulfilled the
other criteria for democracy in the period, if the elec-
toral rules are identical. However, a judgement call is
sometimes needed to determine what counts as elec-
toral rules and what counts as a relevant change to these
rules (Knutsen & Wig, 2015, p. 909).6
The freeness and fairness of elections could also im-
prove significantly (from no uncertainty to significant un-
certainty about the outcome) under the same (formal)
electoral rules. This applies, among other cases, to the
5 This is a prominent feature of the Democracy Barometer and a number of governance measures, such as the Rule of Law Index by the World Justice
Project (2016).
6 This point applies more generally to seemingly fact-based indicators used to measure democracy, where elements of judgement cannot be
fully excluded.
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Dominican Republic between 1966 and 2002. In this pe-
riod, election outcomes varied greatly and, according
to comprehensive case studies, did not meet the min-
imum threshold for electoral democracy before 1978
(Marsteintredet, 2009, Chapter 4). In other cases, govern-
ment turnovermerely signifies that the ruling coalition is
split and no longer controls the sufficient means to stay
in power—a situation that the opposition exploits to gain
power through manipulated elections. This problem ap-
plies to, for example, the change from conservative to lib-
eral hegemonic rule in Columbia (1930–1931) and Pres-
ident Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s rise to power in connection
with the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, govern-
ment turnover often provides strong and relevant indica-
tion of free electoral competition, but it is not unprob-
lematic and undisputable evidence (see Bogaards, 2007;
Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2013; Skaaning et al., 2015).
Another well-known example is Vanhanen’s (2000)
use of voter turnout and the vote share of the largest
party in order to capture different degrees of democracy.
These indicators tend to fail to tap all of the relevant
aspects of democracy, however, such as the degree of
freedom of expression and the power of the parliament,
while capturing things that do not directly reflect the
level of democracy, such as mandatory voting, dissatis-
faction with the government, and the weather on voting
day (Bollen, 1990, pp. 8, 15). Both the official statistics on
turnout rates and vote share could also be unreliable—
either because the data has been manipulated or be-
cause the data providers have been unable to collect
all of the relevant information and aggregate them cor-
rectly. Some governments simply do not have the capac-
ity to collect and handle the relevant information, which
leads to missingness or flawed estimates. Other govern-
ments and/or their agents have strong incentives (and
few constraints) to manipulate official data in order to
misinform their own citizens and foreign governments
and organizations (Herrera & Kapur, 2007).
Both of these circumstances can seriously reduce
the availability and quality of data that could be rele-
vant for measuring democracy, since they tend to be
politically sensitive. Even in the case of so-called hard
economic data (e.g. GDP per capita and trade), where
governments and international organizations invest ex-
tensive resources in the collection of information and
calculate the figures used by countless social scientists,
there are remarkable problems regarding reliability and
validity (Jerven, 2013; Kerner, 2014). There is therefore
good reason to refrain from buying into the claim that
fact-based data are always more informative and less bi-
ased than judgement-based data (see, e.g., Bollen, 1992;
Coppedge et al., 2017a, 2017b; Kaufman & Kraay, 2008;
Schedler, 2012). Public statistical information and other
types of observable data can be useful for measuring
democracy, but directly observable indicators do not cap-
ture all aspects of democracy well.
3.2. In-House Coded Data
One way of overcoming problems related to the lack of
good observable indicators is to base scores on different
kinds of relevant information found in diverse sources
providing country-specific information, such as newspa-
pers, election observation reports, human rights reports,
and academicworks. The construction of in-house coded
data normally follows a particular procedure: Relevant
information is gathered, after which a coder evaluates
the evidence on one or more particular issues and trans-
lates the evaluation into a score based on more or less
explicit and precise standards. Note, furthermore, that in
the case of in-house coding, the coders are not experts
on all of the (many) countries (and maybe also not the
substantive areas) they assign scores to.
In-house coded data has three major advantages:
It can be used to capture important traits that are
largely undetectable by observational data (Bollen, 1993,
p. 1210; Hadenius & Teorell, 2005, pp. 14–15; Main-
waring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001, p. 61; Munck &
Verkuilen, 2002, p. 18). In many cases, bits and pieces of
evidence can be put together to create a more general
understanding of the actual respect for different demo-
cratic rights. On this basis, raters can make an informed
estimate of the extent of, say, electoral contestation,
freedom of expression, and fair trails, which would oth-
erwise be very difficult to capture in a nuanced manner.
Another positive feature of in-house coded data is
that the centralized assignment of scores by one or a
few selected coders, ceteris paribus, generally makes for
a higher degree of consistency when applying coding
criteria. The understandings of concepts and scales will
simply be more uniform compared to (more ‘decentral-
ized’) expert surveys and public opinion surveys. In other
words, in-house coding facilitates similar applications of
standards across countries, especially if the number of
coders is low and they are carefully trained and super-
vised. The use of multiple coders and inter-coder reliabil-
ity tests are valuable tools to assess whether the assump-
tions about consensus among coders are met, i.e. there
is consistency in the estimate if the data-generating pro-
cedure is repeated by the same or different coders (see
Gwet, 2014).7
The third potential advantage is that in-house coding
facilitates standardized and detailed documentation of
why particular observations are assigned certain values.
Detailed documentation of the motivation behind the
particular scores can obviously be very time-consuming,
which is probably why it is not provided in connec-
tion to any of the democracy measures based on in-
house coding.
There are other reasons for hesitating before accept-
ing values derived from in-house coding. The use of in-
house coded data (and judgement-based data more gen-
erally) is sometimes rejected with reference to its sub-
7 Such as those made public in connection to BTI, CIRI, and Polity for a single year and, more appropriately, for a random selection of 10% of the country-
years in connection to LIED.
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jective nature. In contrast to genuine subjective mea-
sures, however, such as data on public attitudes, ‘they
are not supposed to be subjective, but intersubjective:
grounded in public facts and public reasons, defensible in
the face of critique’ (Schedler, 2012, p. 24). Despite this
well-taken qualification, coder-specific biases can still in-
fluence the scores in different stages of the coding pro-
cess (Bollen & Paxton, 1998, 2000):
First, differential use of sources of information, com-
bined with the filtering of information across the
world, could lead to specific judge-centered method
factors. Second, judges can process the information
available to them in such a way as to differentially
weight relevant events or to include irrelevant fac-
tors. Finally, the methods of constructing a measure
might introduce method effects. (Bollen & Paxton,
2000, p. 64)
In-house coders do not have expert knowledge of all of
the countries they code. Theymust therefore rely on sec-
ondary sources, which obviously differ with respect to
availability and relevance. Systematic distortion of infor-
mation is likely as it makes its way from the actual prac-
tices and events to the sources of information used by
the coders. Accessible data can be ordered according to
its informative value. The best situation would be for all
relevant information to be available, but this is unrealis-
tic. The following ordering of information therefore ap-
plies: recorded, accessible, locally reported, and inter-
nationally/foreign reported (Bollen, 1992, pp. 198–199).
Movement from the former to the latter resembles a fil-
tering process where some information passes through
and some does not.
This process is likely to introduce biases. Filters often
tend to be selective in non-random fashions, meaning
that the information is neither complete nor represen-
tative (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2000, p. 766; Milner, Poe,
& Leblang, 1999, p. 420). This is due to differences in
the openness of countries, how much international at-
tention they receive (influences by size, language, etc.),
ideological preferences of the media, specific agendas
of scholarly works and reports, and so forth. While most
of the providers of original in-house coding (LIED, Polity,
V-Dem) use multiple sources (which are generally un-
specified), only CIRI makes use of the Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices issued by the US State De-
partment.8 This fact means that the validity to a very
high degree depends on the representativeness and im-
partiality of a single source, which has been accused
of being biased—especially in the early releases (see
Innes, 1992; Poe, Carey, & Vazquez, 2001; Qian & Yana-
gizawa, 2009).9
In the next step, raters can introduce random and sys-
tematic measurement errors by interpreting the sources
differently, either because they based their evaluation
of different pieces of relevant or irrelevant information,
because they weight the same evidence differently, or
because they have different understandings of concepts
and scales guiding the coding process.10 According to Ra-
worth (2001, p. 114), ‘The identity of the individuals giv-
ing the ratings is inevitably open to questioning’.
Differences in the specific coding processes can also
influence the scores. Raters can assign scores to many or
few countries (and different groups of countries); they
can finalize scores immediately or go back and revise
some of them; they can code everything between one
year and hundreds of consecutive years at the time; and
they can work on the coding in a relatively short but in-
tensive period or carry out the task over a longer, less-
intensive period. All of these factors will tend to influ-
ence the implicit reference points in the minds of coders
and thus have an impact on the scores. The ability of in-
house coded data to capture latent regime features in a
consistent way is promising, while biases introduced in
the coding process and the lack of comprehensive case
knowledge are among the potential downsides of this
kind of data.
3.3. Expert Survey Data
Expert survey data is generated through assessments of
the fulfilment of democratic rights with the help of in-
formed experts, often scholars or other persons working
in related fields and intimately acquainted with the sub-
ject matter, such as journalists or leading members of
NGOs. The main advantage of expert surveys compared
to in-house coded data is exactly the case knowledge.
The experts presumably know the relevant context and
details about the issues in question (Marquardt et al.,
2017). If their knowledge is insufficient, they have a supe-
rior background for finding relevant information. Experts
may even have sufficient contextual knowledge to pro-
vide a plausible estimate if there is limited available evi-
dence in terms of written sources directly tapping into a
particular phenomenon. Original expert surveys are part
of BTI, EIU, FH, PEI, and V-Dem; the three former only
use one expert per country, while PEI and V-Dem use
multiple experts per country (Coppedge et al., 2017a,
p. 8). V-Dem even divides its survey into different cate-
gories, and to some degree enlists different experts to fill
out different parts of the overall survey for each country
(Coppedge et al., 2017b).
The potential problems identified in relation to in-
house coded data also apply to expert surveys. The filter-
ing of information might not be as big a problem due to
8 To code physical integrity rights, CIRI also employs the Annual Reports from Amnesty International.
9 For detailed discussions of potential biases in the Freedom House scores, see Bollen and Paxton (2000), Giannone (2010), and Steiner (2016).
10 As stated by Bollen (1990, p. 18), ‘A variety of personal factors could unconsciously affect a judge’s ratings. These include the relation of the country
being rated to the judge’s home country, the political orientation of the judge, or any personal stakes in the rating’. Actually, one kind of personal stake,
namely academic credibility, will tend to increase the quality of the data, while disinterest in the quality of the product (as is probably the case, at least
in relative terms, for many research assistants) can produce low reliability.
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the case expertise. However, the selection andweighting
of evidence and the coding process will differ somewhat
from expert to expert, partly depending on personal fac-
tors, such as updated and relevant familiarity with the
cases, political leaning, job situation, and work effort
(Bollen & Paxton, 1998). Expert knowledge varies and is
sometimes inadequate, and the experts often lack strong
incentives to enlist and spend much time doing a seri-
ous coding job, including searches for additional informa-
tion. Furthermore, limited and differentiated knowledge
leaves room for the so-called ‘halo effect,’ which is the
tendency for a good (or bad) impression of performance
in one area to influence opinion regarding other areas
(Sequeira, 2012). These circumstances draw attention to
the three-fold challenge related to the recruitment of ex-
perts. The experts should preferably be the most knowl-
edgeable, unbiased, and be ready to do a careful job.
However, the enrolled experts are rarely the best possi-
ble according to these criteria.
Experts are alsomore prone to apply different coding
criteria than in-house coders because expert surveys are
mostly carried out as decentralized coding without prior
training, meaning that the basic understanding of con-
cepts and scales can vary greatly (see Martinez i Coma
& Van Ham, 2015; Steenbergen &Marks, 2007). BTI, EUI,
and FH combine their expert assessments with review
and deliberation across a team of in-house analysts. For
good reason, this approach is assumed to increase cross-
country consistency. The procedures are not transparent,
however, since it is not made public which changes are
introduced to the original expert-based values and why
for any of the cases.
V-Dem has a different approach to increase the com-
parability and reduce the influence of potential biases.
A complex Bayesian IRT measurement model uses in-
formation about agreement across coders, self-assigned
uncertainty estimates by the experts about their own
ratings, personal coder characteristics (extracted from
a post-questionnaire survey), links between countries
based on experts assessing more than one country (ei-
ther for all years or one year), and vignettes related to the
survey questions in order to align the experts’ thresholds
(see Pemstein et al., 2017). This procedure also supple-
ments the scores with a systematic assessment of mea-
surement uncertainty. This is also done for PEI but only
based on the degree of expert agreement.
The documentation of the justifications for the
scores is desirable, just as in the case of in-house cod-
ing. Even though it is usually impossible for experts ‘to
relate the numerical conclusions they reach to the pre-
cise pieces and bits of information that have gone into
them…they should be able to document the big picture
[and] describe the range of uncertainty and controversy
regarding their judgmental decisions with reference to
concrete documentary evidence (or the lack of such ev-
idence)’ Schedler (2012, p. 32). The extra workload for
the experts and coordinators to provide and standard-
ize the information makes this procedure very resource-
demanding. Nonetheless, BTI and FH complement their
scores with relatively detailed country reports, mean-
ing that one can get an impression of what events and
circumstances have influenced the scores for different
aspects of democracy (but they do not provide ade-
quate references to the material on which the reports
are based).
In sum, the comparative advantage of expert surveys
comes to the fore in situations of incomplete or incon-
sistent information, where contextual knowledge can be
used to bridge informational gaps (Schedler, 2012, p. 28).
However, the reliance on the personal judgements of a
few experts means that the data might lack comparabil-
ity and might be affected by different kinds of biases.
3.4. Representative Survey Data
The final type of data, representative surveys of the gen-
eral population, brings the knowledge and opinions of
ordinary citizens into play. Mayne and Geissel (2016)
argue in favor of including a citizen component in the
measurement of democratic quality. It should capture
the citizens’ democratic commitments, political capaci-
ties, and political participation. This perspective, how-
ever, seems more relevant for the measurement of de-
liberative and participatory democracy than electoral
and liberal democracy. In connection to these more lim-
ited understandings of democracy, the suggested addi-
tions are better understood as possible causes or con-
sequences of democracy. Pickel, Breustedt and Smolka
(2016) also advocate for the inclusion of representative
survey data in the measurement of democratic quality.
They propose that citizen evaluations of democratic per-
formance should complement other types of data.
For some purposes, representative surveys can pro-
vide valuable information. Respondents can function as
‘everyday experts’ on issues that are otherwise hard to
get firm knowledge about. A case in point is petty cor-
ruption, where the experiences of citizens with having
to pay bribes could be a superior source of information
(see Naval, Walter, & de Miguel, 2008; Razafindrakoto
& Roubaud, 2010). Another would be information about
whether citizens experience or participate in political vi-
olence (see Bhavnani & Backer, 2007).
However, there are also noteworthy problems associ-
ated with the use of data from representative surveys to
measure democracy. Most citizens lack nuanced knowl-
edge about the general dynamics and performance of
particular political institutions. Gut feelings and personal
opinions are thus likely to influence the scores. Most
drawbacks of judgement-based data applymore strongly
to representative survey data than in-house coded data
and data based on expert surveys (cf. Marquardt et al.,
2017). Experts and in-house coders generally have bet-
ter backgrounds for carrying out such assessments. They
generally possess a broader knowledge regarding the po-
litical history of other countries and data collection pro-
cedures, a higher degree of shared understanding about
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the meaning of particular concepts, and a strong scien-
tific ethos (or least an interest in maintaining their aca-
demic credibility). This implies that individual biases and
dissimilar standards (both within and across countries)
in the interpretation of questions and scales are more
pronounced. Ordinary citizens also tend to be more sus-
ceptible to collective cultural biases (nation-wide inclina-
tions), and the respondents in representative surveys are
very unlikely to provide any form of systematic reasoning
for their entries. Ordinary citizens might also be afraid to
share their experiences or express their honest opinion,
especially in the case of an oppressive regime (Tannen-
berg, 2017).
Does this mean that we should generally refrain
from using representative surveys to measure at all? Or-
dinary citizens might possibly possess valuable knowl-
edge based on their real-life experiences that could
supplement that of experts. Here, it seems pertinent
to distinguish between experience-based questions and
perception-based questions. The former ask citizens
about their own experiences regarding particular situa-
tions (e.g. how often they have been asked to pay a bribe
or been subjected to violent assaults in the previous
year). The latter is typically based onmore abstract ques-
tions, asking about the lay of the land regarding democ-
racy, civil liberties, corruption, etc.
The experience-based questions have greater poten-
tial for providing relevant information than the second
type, which are likely to produce unreliable and biased
democracy indicators. Combined with the relatively low
coverage in terms of years and countries,11 it is therefore
unadvisable to use perception-baseddata from represen-
tative surveys for democracy measurement. None of the
evaluatedmeasures are based on original data collection
using this approach, but DB, EIU, UDS, and WGI rely on
such data—either directly or indirectly (by including com-
posite measures that use them).
4. Discussion
There are several ways of countering the disadvantages
identified above. In relation to in-house coded and ex-
pert survey data, the documentation should ideally pro-
vide answers to the following questions: What evidence
has been used andwhy? And how has the evidence been
weighed and processed and why? That is, the criteria for
identifying and selecting relevant sources and the crite-
ria for extracting and using relevant information must be
pinned down. This work can be done to different degrees
of perfection to the point where every score is supple-
mented with nuanced description of the evidence (us-
ing active citation; see Moravcsik, 2014), how and why
it has been weighted in certain ways (with relevance as
the main criteria; see Bowman et al., 2005; Lustik, 1996;
Møller & Skaaning, 2017), and who has been involved
and how in the data collection and processing (Schedler,
2012, p. 33).
Inconsistency and personal biases can be reduced by
the construction and application of specific and justified
definitions of what one attempts to measure and the
scales used to distinguish between different levels of ful-
filment. The clarification should preferably be presented
as precisely as possible and linked to concrete (maybe
even paradigmatic) examples. This would support the es-
tablishment of shared anchors for the assignment of val-
ues. Another useful tool is to reduce conceptual com-
plexity through disaggregation. This would imply the cod-
ing of more concrete issues than just freedom of ex-
pression, includingmedia censorship, freedomof private
discussion, harassment of journalists, and monopoly of
news media.
Other factors, such as the exposure of coders to ex-
tensive relevant variation, can also improve the consis-
tency. As a rule of thumb, they are more likely to employ
similar standards across and within cases when the fol-
lowing conditions are fulfilled: The coders assign scores
to a diverse set of many countries; they are willing and
allowed to revise scores; they score long time series; and
they score the cases within a relatively short period.
If in-house coders or experts score the same cases,
formal measurement models can produce replicable
point estimates and estimates of uncertainty.12 One
should note, however, that whereas it will almost always
be good to increase the number of in-house coders (al-
though there will be a diminishing return), more is not al-
ways better in the recruitment of expert coders because
there will be a rather limited number of people with high
levels of relevant expertise. Moreover, an increase in the
number of coders will increase the costs attached to the
data collection, thereby emphasizing the latent tradeoff
between high quality data and coverage.13
Formal measurement models can also be used to
combine data from different datasets based on different
data-generating approaches (i.e. observational data, in-
house coded data, expert survey data, and/or represen-
tative survey data) (Bollen & Paxton, 2000, p. 79). The
advantage of such composite measures is their utiliza-
tion of information from several variables. The combi-
nation of information from different data types can in-
crease the ability to capture related, but distinct, aspects
of the variable in question. In addition, it can reduce the
impact of idiosyncratic measurement errors associated
11 In most cases, it is overly demanding to request respondents to answer questions for several years, coding back in time. Moreover, for different rea-
sons (e.g. regime type, geography, level of socio-economic development), it is extremely difficult to carry out high quality representative surveys in
some countries.
12 Besides the original scores, formal measurement models can utilize other types of information, such as data on the personal characteristics of the
experts or in-house coders and their responses to vignettes linked to the variables (see Pemstein et al., 2017). It is also possible to use a measurement
model approach to calculate point estimates and uncertainty in the case of representative surveys.
13 This caveat about a higher demand for resources applies to several of the suggestions, including circumstanceswhere data providers do not themselves
possess the relevant skills for implementing them.
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with individual indicators. The use of multiple indicators
for the same phenomenon also facilitates an assessment
of how precise the point estimates are through the con-
struction of confidence levels (see Fariss, 2014; Pemstein
et al., 2010). This integrative approach is used (in full or
in part) to construct several of the democracy measures
(see Table 1). By reducing some problems, however, it
risks introducing or increasing others. The integration
can lead to an accumulation of the problems associated
with the individual indicators rather than resolving them.
Moreover, the products tend to be more complex. This
means that the relationship between measures and the
concepts they should capture becomes more blurred.
Extant democracy measures build on different kinds
of data; some only employ in-house coded data, expert
survey data, or observable indicators, while others use
different combinations of two or more of these types
and representative survey data. The identification of the
pros and cons typically associated with the respective
data types has demonstrated that the different method-
ological choices about this issue matter for the reliability
and validity of democracymeasures. Table 2 summarizes
some of the most important strengths and weaknesses
typically associated with the different data types. Some
of the similarities and dissimilarities follow the overall
fact-based and judgement-based distinction, while oth-
ers do not. The overview reveals that the pros and cons
associated with the respective kinds of data are not sim-
ply mirror images of each other.
The discussion reveals the simplicity of the bullet
points in Table 2. They neglect the many nuances of cod-
ing rules and processes that can influence the quality
of the data. The comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages of the different data types vary in both kind and
degree. The reliability and validity depend on the partic-
ular procedures used in the data generating process and
the aspects of democracy one attempts to capture.
The discussion has also revealed that no type of data
is superior to all of the others in all respects when it
comes to measuring the fulfilment of democratic rights.
Hence, the arguments presented have challenged what
many consider conventional wisdom, namely the gen-
eral superiority on one kind of data—directly observable
(fact-based) data. Actually, this belief tends to be a dog-
matic doctrine resting on invalid assumptions. As neatly
summarized by Schedler (2012, p. 21), ‘Banning judg-
ment from measurement is neither a feasible method-
ological imperative nor a desirable one’, and:
If we were to renounce our judgmental faculties in
the measurement of regime properties and regime
dynamics, we would have to renounce the measure-
ment of most of the most interesting regime proper-
ties and regime dynamics. If we truly had expelled
judgment from data development, quantitative re-
search on political regimes could not have blossomed
as it has over the past decades. (Schedler, 2012, p. 33)
This point applies more to the measurement of thicker
understandings of democracy, such as liberal democracy.
Respect for civil liberties and adherence to the rule of law
tend to be even harder to capture without judgement-
based indicators than narrow electoral criteria (regular,
inclusive, and competitive elections). Considerable effort
has already been invested in improving democracy mea-
sures. More can still be done to increase the reliabil-
ity and validity, however, and greater awareness about
these issues among data users is required.
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Table 2. General advantages and disadvantages associated with different data types.
Advantages Disadvantages
Observational data • Avoid personal biases • Relevant information often not
• Fixed and comparable scales • directly observable
• Transparent documentation of scores • Biases and limitations in available information
In-house coded data • Consistency in the application • Personal biases
• of coding criteria • Biases and limitations in the
• Capture latent traits • available information
• Limited, case-specific knowledge
Expert survey data • Case-specific knowledge • Personal biases
• Capture latent traits • Inconsistently applied coding criteria
Representative survey data • Experience-based knowledge • Personal biases
• Capture latent traits • Unfeasible in particular settings
• Inconsistently applied coding criteria
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